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Agrowing body of qualitative evidence shows that loss aversion, a phenomenon formalized in prospecttheory, can explain a variety of ﬁeld and experimental data. Quantiﬁcations of loss aversion are, how-
ever, hindered by the absence of a general preference-based method to elicit the utility for gains and losses
simultaneously. This paper proposes such a method and uses it to measure loss aversion in an experimental
study without making any parametric assumptions. Thus, it is the ﬁrst to obtain a parameter-free elicitation
of prospect theory’s utility function on the whole domain. Our method also provides an efﬁcient way to elicit
utility midpoints, which are important in axiomatizations of utility. Several deﬁnitions of loss aversion have
been put forward in the literature. According to most deﬁnitions we ﬁnd strong evidence of loss aversion, at
both the aggregate and the individual level. The degree of loss aversion varies with the deﬁnition used, which
underlines the need for a commonly accepted deﬁnition of loss aversion.
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1. Introduction
Economic analyses of decision under risk com-
monly assume that people maximize expected util-
ity. Much empirical evidence suggests, however, that
people systematically violate expected utility theory
(Camerer 1995, Starmer 2000). For example, measure-
ments of utility under expected utility have often led
to inconsistencies (Hershey and Schoemaker 1985).
Rabin (2000) showed that the commonly observed
degree of risk aversion over small stakes implies an
unrealistic degree of risk aversion over large stakes
under expected utility. The danger of using biased
utilities is, obviously, that predictions of decisions will
be distorted.
One important reason why people deviate from
expected utility is loss aversion: People interpret out-
comes as gains and losses relative to a reference
point and are more sensitive to losses than to abso-
lutely commensurate gains. Many empirical studies
have found evidence of loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman
et al. 1990, Tversky and Kahneman 1991, Barberis
et al. 2001). Loss aversion can also explain a vari-
ety of ﬁeld data (Camerer 2000). Important examples
are the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott
1985, Benartzi and Thaler 1995), asymmetric price
elasticities (Hardie et al. 1993), downward-sloping
labor supply (Dunn 1996, Camerer et al. 1997, Goette
et al. 2004), and the buying strategies of hog farmers
(Pennings and Smidts 2003). Rabin (2000) argued that
loss aversion can account for the modest-scale risk
aversion for both large and small stakes that is typi-
cally observed in empirical studies and that expected
utility cannot explain. Novemsky and Kahneman
(2005) observed that risk aversion in mixed gambles
involving small stakes can be attributed exclusively
to loss aversion. A formal theory of loss aversion is
prospect theory, currently the most popular theory
of decision under risk (Kahneman and Tversky 1979,
Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
To measure loss aversion, the utility for gains and
for losses must be determined simultaneously, i.e.,
utility must be determined completely. To achieve
this, the existing methods for measuring loss aver-
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sion impose additional (e.g., parametric) assump-
tions. The main problem in designing a method to
measure utility completely is that prospect theory
assumes that people weight probabilities and that
probability weighting for gains may be different from
probability weighting for losses. Wakker and Deneffe
(1996) showed how utility can be measured for gains
and losses separately under prospect theory. Their
method, the trade-off method, is robust to probability
weighting when all outcomes are of the same sign.
The trade-off method does not, however, allow mea-
suring the utility for gains and losses simultaneously;
i.e., it does not allow for the measurement of loss
aversion.
The purpose of this paper is to measure loss aver-
sion at the individual level and without making para-
metric assumptions. We, thus, obtain a parameter-free
method to completely measure utility under prospect
theory. There are several advantages of using non-
parametric instead of parametric measurements. First,
parametric measurements depend on the appropri-
ateness of the selected functional forms so that one
does not know whether the measurements are driven
by the data or by the imposed parametric assump-
tions. A second advantage of nonparametric mea-
surements is that they provide a direct link between
utilities and choices. This is important for descrip-
tive reasons because examining the observed choices
gives insight into the psychological reasoning that
underlies the data. The direct link between utilities
and choices is also important for prescriptive deci-
sion analysis, because it allows solving inconsisten-
cies in utility measurement. If inconsistencies are
observed then these can be immediately related to
particular choices and resolving these inconsistencies
will yield new insights into what a client’s true val-
ues are. Under parametric measurements there is no
direct link between utilities and choices and, hence,
they provide no insight into the processes underly-
ing the data and they are not suitable for prescriptive
analyses.
Our method is based on the elicitation of util-
ity midpoints. Utility midpoints have often been
used in axiomatizations of decision models. A cen-
tral step in our method is the elicitation of probabil-
ities (for decision under risk) or events (for decision
under uncertainty) that have a decision weight of 0.5.
Such events can be interpreted as a generalization of
Ramsey’s (1931) ethically neutral events, i.e., events
with subjective probability 0.5 under expected utility,
to prospect theory.
In the experiment, described in §4, we use our
method to completely elicit utility under prospect
theory. After we determine the utility for gains and
losses, we can measure the degree of loss aversion
according to the various deﬁnitions of loss aversion
that have been put forward in the literature. We ﬁnd
clear evidence of loss aversion according to most def-
initions, both at the aggregate and at the individual
level. The different deﬁnitions of loss aversion lead,
however, to different results, which emphasizes the
need for a commonly accepted deﬁnition of loss aver-
sion. This issue will be discussed in further detail
in §6.
The elicitation of utility also allows for a test of
prospect theory’s assumption that utility is concave
for gains and convex for losses. Previous studies gen-
erally found that utility was concave for gains, but
for losses the evidence is less clear-cut: Most stud-
ies found (slightly) convex utility for losses, but for
a sizeable proportion of subjects the utility for losses
was linear or concave. Most of these measurements
either assumed expected utility or speciﬁc paramet-
ric forms of utility, which may have led to biased
measurements. In our data we ﬁnd clear support for
prospect theory: Concave utility on the gain domain
and convex utility on the loss domain hold both at
the aggregate and at the individual level.
In what follows, §2 reviews prospect theory and
the existing empirical evidence on loss aversion and
the utility for gains and losses. Section 3 describes
our method for the estimation of the utility for gains
and losses under prospect theory. Section 4 describes
the design of an experiment that elicited the utility
function using the method described in §3. Section 5
presents the results of the experiment. Section 6 dis-
cusses the results and concludes.
2. Background
2.1. Prospect Theory
We consider an individual who has to make a choice
under risk between prospects with at most two
distinct outcomes. On the domain of two-outcome
prospects, original prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979) and new (or cumulative) prospect the-
ory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) coincide, and
hence our derivations and estimations are valid for
both theories.
We write x py for the prospect that results in
outcome x with probability p and in outcome y with
probability 1− p. The individual has preferences over
prospects and we use the conventional notation ,
, and ∼ to represent the relations of strict prefer-
ence, weak preference, and indifference. Outcomes are
monetary and more money is always preferred. If
x= y, the prospect is riskless, otherwise it is risky. Out-
comes are expressed as changes with respect to the
status quo or reference point, i.e., as gains or losses.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the reference
point is 0. A prospect that involves both a gain and
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a loss outcome is called mixed, otherwise it is non-
mixed. For notational convenience, we assume that
all prospects x py are rank-ordered. If a nonmixed
prospect involves only gains [losses], we assume that
x ≥ y ≥ 0 x ≤ y ≤ 0	, i.e., the ﬁrst outcome in a non-
mixed prospect is always the most extreme. For mixed
prospects we assume that x > 0>y.
The individual evaluates each prospect and chooses
the prospect that offers the highest overall utility. The
overall utility of a prospect is expressed in terms of
three functions: a probability weighting function w+
for gains, a probability weighting function w− for
losses, and a utility function U . The functions w+
and w− assign a probability weight to each probabil-
ity. They are strictly increasing and satisfy w+0 =
w−0 = 0 and w+1 = w−1 = 1. The utility func-
tion U assigns a real number to each outcome, which
reﬂects the desirability of that outcome. The func-
tion U is increasing and satisﬁes U0= 0. U is a ratio
scale, i.e., we can arbitrarily choose the unit of the
function.
The evaluation of a prospect depends amongst
other things on the sign of the outcomes. If the
prospect x py is nonmixed then its utility is
wipUx+ 1−wipUy (1)
where i = + for gains and i = − for losses. If the
prospect x py is mixed then its utility is
w+pUx+w−1− pUy (2)
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assumed that the
probability weighting functions w+ and w− over-
weight small probabilities and underweight moder-
ate and high probabilities, giving rise to an inverse
S-shaped probability weighting function. The utility
function is assumed to be concave for gains and con-
vex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains.
2.2. Shape of Utility
Let us next turn to the empirical evidence on
the predictions made by prospect theory. We focus
on loss aversion and utility in this paper. Empir-
ical studies on the probability weighting function
have generally conﬁrmed that small probabilities are
overweighted and moderate and large probabilities
are underweighted (Tversky and Kahneman 1992,
Camerer and Ho 1994, Tversky and Fox 1995, Wu and
Gonzalez 1996, Gonzalez and Wu 1999, Abdellaoui
2000, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000).
Empirical measurements have corroborated that
the utility for gains is concave. This holds both
when expected utility is assumed (e.g., Fishburn and
Kochenberger 1979) and when prospect theory is
assumed (Fennema and van Assen 1998, Abdellaoui
2000, Abdellaoui et al. 2005).
The evidence on the utility for losses is less clear-
cut. Several studies determined the utility for losses
under the assumption that expected utility holds.
Most of these studies found convex utility for losses
for the majority of cases (Fishburn and Kochenberger
1979, Pennings and Smidts 2003), but a sizeable
minority of subjects, around 40%, had concave util-
ity for losses. The assumption of expected utility in
these studies led to a bias in the direction of con-
vexity of the utility function. They determined util-
ity by comparing a sure loss with a two-outcome
prospect that offered a probability p of a larger loss
and a probability 1 − p of no loss. The probabilities
used exceeded 1/3. Under prospect theory, probabil-
ities above 1/3 are generally underweighted making
such risky losses more attractive relative to sure losses
of equivalent expected value and, hence, enhancing
risk seeking.
Under expected utility, convexity of utility is equiv-
alent to risk seeking. Under prospect theory, this
equivalence no longer holds. For example, if a sub-
ject indicates that he is indifferent between a sure loss
of E40 and the two-outcome prospect (−E100, 1/2; E0),
then Equation (1) reveals that this risk-seeking pref-
erence is consistent with a concave utility for money
if w−1/2 < 04. Therefore, previous ﬁndings of risk-
seeking behavior for losses (e.g., Laughhunn et al.
1980, Currim and Sarin 1989, Myagkov and Plott 1997,
Heath et al. 1999) provide, under prospect theory,
no conclusive evidence in favor of convex utility for
losses.
The following studies have estimated the utility for
losses under prospect theory, thereby avoiding bias
due to probability weighting. Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) assumed a power function for the utility for
losses and a one-parameter functional form for prob-
ability weighting and found a median power coef-
ﬁcient of 0.88, which corresponds to a slightly con-
vex utility for losses; no individual data are given.
Fennema and van Assen (1998), Abdellaoui (2000),
Etchart-Vincent (2004), Schunk and Betsch (2006),
and Booij and van de Kuilen (2006) used the trade-
off method (Wakker and Deneffe 1996) to elicit the
utility function for losses. The ﬁndings from these
studies are similar. At the aggregate level, they all
found slightly convex utility for losses (median power
coefﬁcients vary between 0.84 and 0.97). At the indi-
vidual level, the most common pattern was convex
utility for losses (between 24% and 47% of the sub-
jects), but concave and linear utility functions were
also common.
2.3. Loss Aversion
Many empirical studies have conﬁrmed the impor-
tance of loss aversion. A signiﬁcant source of evidence
comes from the observed disparities between peo-
ple’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain
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various goods and their minimum willingness to
accept (WTA) in exchange for giving those goods up.
Median and mean WTA values have been found to be
between 1.4 and 16.5 times as large as the correspond-
ing WTP values (Kahneman et al. 1990). Although
these studies provide some insight into the degree of
loss aversion, it is hard to estimate the degree of loss
aversion because other factors such as substitution
and income effects may have affected the comparison.
A complication in the measurement of loss aver-
sion is that there is no agreed-on deﬁnition of loss
aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed
that loss aversion should be deﬁned by −U−x >
Ux for all x > 0. This suggests that a loss aver-
sion coefﬁcient could be deﬁned as the mean or
median of −U−x/Ux over the relevant values
of x. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) implicitly used
−U−$1/U$1 as an index of loss aversion.1 Neilson
(2002) proposed to deﬁne loss aversion by U−x/
−x≥Uy/y for all positive x and y. It is not obvious
how to deﬁne a coefﬁcient of loss aversion for this
deﬁnition. One possible candidate is the ratio of the
inﬁnum of U−x/−x over the supremum of Uy/y,
xy > 0. Wakker and Tversky (1993) deﬁned loss aver-
sion as the requirement that U ′−x≥U ′x for all x >
0, i.e., the slope of the utility function at each loss is at
least as large as the slope of the utility function at the
absolutely commensurate gain, and provided a pref-
erence axiomatization. Their deﬁnition can be related
to a loss aversion coefﬁcient of the mean or median
of U ′−x/U ′x. A stronger deﬁnition was used by
Bowman et al. (1999): Loss aversion holds if U ′−x≥
U ′y for all positive x and y. That is, the slope of
the utility function for losses is everywhere steeper
than the slope of the utility function for gains. Neilson
(2002) gave a preference foundation for this deﬁnition.
A possible resulting candidate for a coefﬁcient of loss
aversion is infU ′−x/ supU ′y, xy > 0. In a recent
paper Köbberling and Wakker (2005) argued to deﬁne
the loss aversion coefﬁcient as U ′↑0/U
′
↓0, where
U ′↑0 stands for the left derivative and U
′
↓0 for the
right derivative of U at the reference point. A simi-
lar deﬁnition was suggested by Benartzi and Thaler
(1995). Schmidt and Zank (2005) proposed another,
behavioral, deﬁnition of loss aversion, which is equiv-
alent to the deﬁnition of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) under original prospect theory. Because origi-
nal and new prospect theory coincide for the domain
of prospects considered in this paper, we do not have
to consider their deﬁnition separately.
Table 1 gives an overview of studies that have esti-
mated a loss aversion coefﬁcient. Bleichrodt et al.
(2001) estimated two loss aversion coefﬁcients using
1 This follows from their choice of a power utility function.
Table 1 Estimates of the Loss Aversion Coefﬁcient
Study Deﬁnition Domain Estimates
Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979)
U ′−x
U ′x
Money 48
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
−U−1
U1
Money 225
Bleichrodt et al. (2001)
−U−x
Ux
Health 217
306
Schmidt and Traub (2002)
U ′−x
U ′x
Money 143
Pennings and Smidts (2003)
U ′−x
U ′x
Money 181
Booij and van de Kuilen (2006)
U ′↑0
U ′↓0
Money 179
174
different data sets. Booij and van de Kuilen (2006) esti-
mated separate loss aversion coefﬁcients for high and
low monetary amounts. The different studies, besides
adopting different parametric assumptions about util-
ity and probability weighting, used different deﬁni-
tions of loss aversion. The estimated values for the
coefﬁcient of loss aversion vary, but are hard to com-
pare because of the different assumptions and def-
initions used, and because some studies reported
median values (Fishburn and Kochenberger 1979,
Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Bleichrodt et al. 2001)
and others mean values.
The estimates in Table 1 are based on aggregate
data. Two studies examined loss aversion at the
individual level. Both studies performed qualitative
tests rather than quantitative measurements. Schmidt
and Traub (2002) used the deﬁnition of Wakker and
Tversky (1993) and found that 33% of their subjects
were loss averse. Twenty-four percent of their sub-
jects behaved exactly opposite to loss aversion, i.e.,
they behaved as if they focused more on gains than
on losses, a response pattern that we will label gain
seeking. Bleichrodt and Pinto (2002) used the deﬁ-
nition of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in a deci-
sion context involving health outcomes and no risk,
and found that the proportion of loss averse sub-
jects varied between 5% and 30% across experiments.
The proportion of gain-seeking subjects was very low,
between 0% and 2.5%.
3. Elicitation Procedure
The procedure to estimate the utility for gains and
losses consists of four steps and is summarized in
Table 2. The second column of the table describes
the quantity that is assessed, the third the indiffer-
ence that is sought, and the fourth the implication of
this indifference under prospect theory. The ﬁnal col-
umn shows the variables that have to be speciﬁed and
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Table 2 Four-Step Elicitation Procedure
Assessed quantity Indifference Under prospect theory Choice variables∗
Step 1 1 1 p∗∼ 0 p	 U0−U1= U1−U2 p= 0332 2 p∗∼ 1 p ∗ =−100
p 1 ∼ 2 p 0 w−p = 05  =−600
0 =−1000
1 1 p
∗∼ 0 p 	 U2−U1= U1−U0 p= 0332 2 p∗∼ 1 p ∗ = 100
pɡ 1 ∼ 2 pɡ0 w+pɡ= 05 = 600
0 = 1000
Step 2 Lr ∈ L10 Lr ∼ LA p  LB ULr = 05ULA+ 05ULB L1 =−100000
Step 3  Ls ∼  050 w−05U =−s s= 025
ɡ 0∼ ɡ05   w+05Uɡ= s
Gs Gs ∼ ɡ050 UGs= w+05Uɡ= s
Step 4 Gr ∈ 0Gs Gr ∼ GA pɡGB UGr = 05UGA+ 05UGB
∗All monetary amounts are in French francs (FF).
the choices for these that we made in the experiment
described in §4.
The ﬁrst step of the elicitation determines two
probabilities pɡ and p for which w+pɡ = 1/2 and
w−p  = 1/2. Both elicitations require three indiffer-
ences. Consider the elicitation of p . We will construct
a sequence of losses 0, 1, and 2 that are equally
spaced in terms of utility, i.e., U0 − U1 =
U1 − U2. More speciﬁcally, the process starts
by choosing a probability p and three losses ∗, ,
and 0, with ∗ > >0. Then losses 1 and 2 are
elicited such that a subject is indifferent between the
prospects 1 p∗ and 0 p and between the
prospects 2 p∗ and 1 p. Because ∗ >,
we must have 2 < 1 < 0. Under prospect theory,
the indifferences i+1 p∗ ∼ i p, i = 01,
imply that
Ui−Ui+1=
1−w−p
w−p
U∗−U
i= 01 (3)
Because the expression on the right-hand side is
constant, it follows that U0 − U1 = U1 −
U2. Hence, 1 is a utility midpoint of 0 and 2.
This procedure for eliciting utility midpoints was pre-
viously pointed out by Abdellaoui (2000) and by
Köbberling and Wakker (2003). Having elicited 1
and 2, the probability p is determined that makes
the subject indifferent between 1 for sure and the
prospect 2, p ; 0. This indifference implies that
w−p  = 05.2 The elicitation of pɡ is similar, except
2 Under prospect theory, U1=w−p U2+ 1−w−p U0.
1 being the utility midpoint of 0 and 2 immediately gives
w−p = 05.
that now three monetary gains 0 >  > ∗ are ﬁxed
beforehand.
In the second step of the elicitation, utility is deter-
mined on the loss domain by eliciting utility mid-
points. As Table 2 shows, once p is known the utility
midpoint of any two losses LA and LB can be mea-
sured by eliciting just one indifference. Set UL1=−1
for some L1 < 0, which is allowed by the uniqueness
properties of the utility function in prospect theory.
Then the outcome L05 is determined such that the
subject is indifferent between L05 for sure and the
prospect L1 p0. Under prospect theory, this indif-
ference implies that UL05 = −05. Then proceed to
elicit U on the interval L10	. For example, by setting
LA = L05 and LB = 0, we can elicit the outcome L025
for which UL025=−025.
In the third step, which is the crucial step in the
measurement of loss aversion, utility on the loss
domain is linked to utility on the gain domain by
eliciting three indifferences. In the ﬁrst indifference
we take one of the outcomes that was elicited in step
2, Ls , and determine the loss  such that the sub-
ject is indifferent between Ls and 050. It fol-
lows that w−05U = −s. The second indifference
determines the gain ɡ that makes the subject indiffer-
ent between 0 for sure and ɡ05 . Consequently,
w+05Uɡ = s. The gain Gs that the subject con-
siders equivalent to the prospect ɡ050 then has
utility s and is the “mirror image” of Ls in terms of
utility.
The fourth and ﬁnal step of the elicitation deter-
mines utility on the gain domain. As for losses,
Table 2 shows that the probability pɡ allows measur-
ing the utility midpoint of any two gains GA and GB
through a single indifference. We start by determin-
ing the utility midpoint of Gs and 0 and then proceed
to determine utility on 0Gs	.
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4. Experiment
4.1. General Setup
The aim of the experiment was to use the proce-
dure outlined in §3 to elicit utility and subsequently
measure loss aversion under prospect theory. The
subjects were 48 economics students at Ecole Nor-
male Supérieure, Cachan, France (38% female, mean
age 23). Subjects were paid FF100 (approximately E16)
for their participation. Prior to the actual experiment,
the experimental protocol was tested in pilot sessions.
The experiment was run on a computer. Responses
were collected in personal interview sessions, which
lasted about an hour on average. Subjects were told
that there were no right or wrong answers and that
they were allowed to take a break at any time dur-
ing the interview. All responses were entered in the
computer by the interviewer so that the subject could
focus entirely on the experimental questions. Before
the actual experiment started, subjects were given
several practice questions.
To apply the method described in §3, we had to
specify several parameters. The last column of Table 2
shows the speciﬁcations chosen. All outcomes were
in French francs. To appreciate the signiﬁcance of the
amounts involved, we note that the participants in
the experiment had a monthly income of FF 8,000
(E1,250). We chose substantial monetary amounts to
be able to detect curvature of the utility function.
Over small intervals, utility is approximately linear
(Wakker and Deneffe 1996).
Because substantial losses were involved, individ-
ual responses to the experimental questions were not
played out for real. That is, we only used ques-
tions with hypothetical payoffs. Several studies have
addressed the question whether response patterns dif-
fer between questions with hypothetical outcomes
and questions with real outcomes (see Camerer and
Hogarth 1999 and Hertwig and Ortmann 2001 for
extensive reviews). The general conclusion from these
studies is that the effect of real incentives varies across
decision tasks. For the kind of task that we asked
our subjects to perform, there appears to be no sys-
tematic difference in the general pattern of responses,
although real incentives tend to reduce data variabil-
ity and risk seeking.
Participants were not directly asked for the speciﬁc
value (outcome or probability) leading to indiffer-
ence. Instead, every indifference value was assessed
by means of a series of binary choice questions. Each
binary choice question corresponded to an iteration in
a bisection process, which is described in Appendix
B. A choice-based elicitation procedure was applied
because previous studies have found that inferring
indifferences from a series of choices leads to fewer
inconsistencies than asking subjects directly for their
indifference value (see Luce 2000 for a review).
4.2. Details
We elicited eleven points of the utility function on the
loss domain, Lr , r = 00150031006200930125
02503750506250750875, where ULr = −r ,
and eight points of the utility function on the
gain domain, Gr , r = 00150031006200930125
01560187025, where UGr= r . We collected more
data for losses than for gains to improve the opera-
tionalization of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) deﬁ-
nition of loss aversion. We deliberately elicited many
points close to zero to be able to operationalize
Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) deﬁnition of loss
aversion.
The ﬁrst display in Appendix A (see Figure A1)
illustrates the typical choices subjects faced. Subjects
had to choose one of the options A or B; indiffer-
ence was not allowed. To facilitate responding, sub-
jects were given the option to open a new window
that added a scrollbar to the initial choice display.
This option was only offered during the ﬁrst iter-
ation of the bisection process. Moving the scrollbar
changed the value of the stimulus that we sought
to elicit. At the one extreme of the range of values
that the scrollbar allowed for, the subject could see
that prospect A was clearly better than prospect B, at
the other extreme he could see that prospect B was
clearly better than prospect A. By using the scrollbar,
subjects became aware that there should be a value
for which preferences between the two prospects
switched. Once subjects understood this, the win-
dow with the scrollbar was closed and the program
returned to the initial choice display. Many subjects
kept using the scrollbar throughout the experiment.
The scrollbar is illustrated in the second display in
Appendix A (see Figure A2).
The ﬁrst experimental choice was displayed twice
to familiarize subjects with the task. After each choice,
the subject was asked to conﬁrm his answer. Indif-
ference values were elicited in ﬁve iterations in steps
1, 2, and 4 of our method. In step 3 we used
seven iterations. The pilot sessions had shown that
these numbers of iterations were sufﬁcient to obtain
the indifference values with good precision. After
the ﬁnal iteration, subjects were asked whether the
prospects were ﬁnely balanced for the elicited indif-
ference value; when they indicated that this was not
the case, the bisection process for this elicitation was
started anew. This ﬁnal question intended to mini-
mize the impact of response errors.
We asked four questions to test for consistency.
We established for each of the prospects Gr prLr,
r = 00310062501250250, the probability pr that
made the subject indifferent between the risky
prospect and receiving nothing. Equation (2) and the
results derived before show that in each question we
obtain w+pr  = w−1− pr and, because w+ and w−
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are strictly increasing, we should ﬁnd the same indif-
ference probability in all four questions.
We also tested consistency in another way. Recall
that in the ﬁrst step of the elicitation we constructed
sequences {0, 1, 2} and {0, 1, 2} for which the
difference in utility between successive elements is
constant. We tested whether these equalities between
utility differences were preserved in the elicitation of
the utility function on the loss domain and on the
gain domain in steps 2 and 4 of the elicitation proce-
dure. In general, we did not know the utility of the
i and i, i = 012, and we had to use linear inter-
polation to determine these. However, the quality of
these interpolations was good, because the i and i
were generally concentrated near zero where we had
many observations.
4.3. Analysis
We determined for each subject the shape of the util-
ity function on the gain domain and on the loss
domain by looking at the evolution of the slope of
the utility function at various points. Two elicited
losses Lr and Lr ′ (gains Gr and Gr ′ are adjacent if
Lr > Lr ′ Gr > Gr ′ and there is no elicited loss (gain)
in between. Deﬁne by S↑L r the slope of the segment
linking Lr , ULr and Lr ′ , ULr ′, where Lr and Lr ′
are adjacent. Similarly, S↓L r is deﬁned as the slope
of the segment linking Lr ′′ , ULr ′′ and LrULr,
where Lr ′′ and Lr are adjacent. S
↑
Gr and S
↓
Gr are
deﬁned similarly for adjacent gains. Let SLr =
S↓L r− S↑L r denote the variation of the slope around
Lr when moving toward 0. Similarly SGr= S↓Gr−
S↑Gr designates the variation of the slope around Gr
when moving away from 0. It is easily veriﬁed that
Sir, i =GL, positive [negative, zero] corresponds
to convex [concave, linear] utility.
We obtained 11 values of SLr and seven values of
SGr for each subject. To account for response error,
we classiﬁed a subject’s utility on the loss domain as
convex (concave) if at least seven out of 11 values of
SLr were positive (negative). We classiﬁed a sub-
ject’s utility on the gain domain as convex (concave)
if at least four out of seven values of SGr were pos-
itive (negative). These cut-off values are admittedly
arbitrary. They were selected for two reasons. First,
empirical studies have observed that reversal rates of
1/3 are common in choice tasks and, second, other
studies measuring the utility for gains and the utility
for losses under prospect theory used similar crite-
ria (Fennema and van Assen 1998, Abdellaoui 2000,
Etchart-Vincent 2004). Results for other cut-off values
can be found in the e-companion.3 In addition, we
3 An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the
online version that can be found at http://mansci.journal.informs.
org/.
also provided a classiﬁcation of the subjects based on
their estimated power coefﬁcients, which is described
below and which does not depend on arbitrary cut-off
values.
To smoothen out response errors, we also analyzed
the data assuming speciﬁc parametric forms for util-
ity. We examined three parametric forms: the power
family, the exponential family, and the expo-power
family. The expo-power family was introduced by
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) and is a variation of a two-
parameter family proposed by Saha (1993). Because
the results under the three parametric families were
similar and we observed no signiﬁcant differences in
goodness of ﬁt, we will only report the results for
the power family. Let x = −L/L1, L ∈ −L10	, xɡ =
G/G025, G ∈ 0G025	. The power family is deﬁned on
the gain domain by 025∗xɡ and on the loss domain
by −x . For gains (losses), the power function is
concave (convex) if < 1  < 1, linear if = 1 =
1, and convex (concave) if  > 1  > 1. Nonlinear
least squares was used to estimate the parameters 
and .
We explain next how we operationalized the vari-
ous deﬁnitions of loss aversion described in §2 and
how we measured loss aversion at the individual
level. To test for loss aversion in the Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) sense, we computed −U−Gr/UGr
for each of the eight amounts Gr that we had elicited.
The U−Gr usually had to be determined through
linear interpolation. As we had many observations
for utility on the loss domain, the approximation
by linear interpolation was in general good. Because
we had eight observations of Gr , we could compute
for most subjects eight values of the loss aversion
coefﬁcient −U−Gr/UGr. For ﬁve subjects, G025
exceeded– L1 and we could, therefore, not compute
U−G025. For these subjects, we replaced this miss-
ing observation by taking L1 and determined U−L1.
A subject was classiﬁed as loss averse if at least six
out of eight values of the loss aversion coefﬁcient
exceeded one, as loss neutral if at least six values
were equal to one, and as gain seeking if at least six
values were less than one. We used a more stringent
cut-off value in the classiﬁcation of loss aversion than
in the classiﬁcation of utility curvature because the
sequential structure of our procedure made it more
likely that subjects could be classiﬁed. For example, if
G025 was much larger than −L025 then all the other Gr
will likely also be larger than the −Lr . For this reason
we also considered the results without allowance for
response error.
To operationalize Neilson’s (2002) deﬁnition that
loss aversion holds if U−x/−x >Uy/y for all pos-
itive x and y, we computed for each subject the val-
ues ULr/Lr and UGr/Gr for each Lr and each Gr
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that had been elicited. To allow for response error, a
subject was loss averse if the second smallest value
of the ULr/Lr exceeded the second largest value of
the UGr/Gr and gain seeking if the second small-
est value of the UGr/Gr exceeded the second largest
value of the ULr/Lr . The coefﬁcient of loss aver-
sion was computed as the ratio of the second small-
est value of ULr/Lr over the second largest value of
the UGr/Gr . We also analyzed the results without
accounting for response error and then we used the
minimum instead of the second smallest value and
the maximum instead of the second largest value.
Wakker and Tversky’s (1993) deﬁnition of loss aver-
sion, U ′−x ≥ U ′x for all positive x, was opera-
tionalized by deﬁning for each elicited Gr
U ′Gr= 12 ∗ S↓Gr+ S↑Gr (4a)
and
U ′−Gr= S↓L r (4b)
if Ls′ <−Gr < Ls and Ls and Ls′ are adjacent, and by
deﬁning
U ′−Gr= 12 ∗ S↓L r+ S↑L r (4c)
if −Gr = Ls .
In general, this procedure resulted in eight obser-
vations per subject. For the ﬁve subjects for whom
G025 exceeded −L1, we could not compute U ′−G025.
Instead, we computed U ′L1/U ′−L1. We classiﬁed a
subject as loss averse if at least six out of eight values
of the loss aversion coefﬁcient exceeded one, as loss
neutral if at least six values were equal to one, and as
gain seeking if at least six values were less than one.
The deﬁnition of Bowman et al. (1999), that loss
aversion holds if U ′−x≥U ′y for all positive x and
y, was operationalized by computing U ′Gr as in
Equation (4a) and U ′Lr  as 1/2 ∗ S↓L r + S↑L r for
each Gr and each Lr that had been elicited. Individu-
als were classiﬁed as loss averse if the second smallest
value of the U ′Lr  exceeded the second largest value
of the U ′Gr and as gain seeking if the second small-
est value of the U ′Gr exceeded the second largest
value of the U ′Lr . A loss aversion coefﬁcient was
computed as the ratio of the second smallest value of
the U ′Lr  over the second largest value of the U ′Gr.
We used the minimum and the maximum instead
of the second smallest and the second largest value
when response error was not taken into account.
Finally, the deﬁnition of Köbberling and Wakker
(2005) was operationalized by computing each sub-
ject’s coefﬁcient of loss aversion as the ratio of
UL0015/L0015 over UG0015/G0015, which is equal to
G0015/L0015. If the coefﬁcient of loss aversion exceeded
one, the subject was classiﬁed as loss averse; if it
was equal to one, he was loss neutral; and if it was
less than one, he was gain seeking. Of the deﬁni-
tions considered, only Köbberling and Wakker’s deﬁ-
nition is exhaustive, in the sense that every individual
could always be classiﬁed. In all other deﬁnitions it is
possible that some subjects were left unclassiﬁed.
5. Results
The results of the consistency tests were mixed. We
could not reject the hypotheses that U0−U1=
U1−U2 (p= 0196 by a binomial test, p= 0061
by a paired t-test) and that U2−U1= U1−
U0 (p = 0170 by a binomial test, p = 0192 by
a paired t-test). The hypothesis that p025 = p0125 =
p00625 = p0031 was rejected, however (p = 0001, Fried-
man test). The median (mean) values of p025, p0125,
p00625, and p0031 were 0.64 (0.64), 0.59 (0.60), 0.60 (0.58),
and 0.52 (0.56). Paired comparisons showed signiﬁ-
cant differences between p025 and the other pi, but not
between p0125, p00625, and p0031.
Appendix C shows for each subject the elicited
probabilities p and pɡ, the estimated coefﬁcients of
the power function, and the values of the ﬁve loss
aversion coefﬁcients.
5.1. The Utility for Gains and Losses
The median values of p and of pɡ were equal to 0.59
and 0.60, respectively. Because w−p =w+pɡ= 1/2,
our data reveal underweighting of probability around
0.60. This is consistent with other ﬁndings in the
literature. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) found
w+065= 1/2 and w−057= 1/2; Abdellaoui (2000)
found w+065= 1/2 and w−053= 1/2. In contrast
with Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Abdellaoui
(2000), we found no difference in probability weight-
ing for gains and for losses (paired t-test, p = 0278).
At the individual level we also found clear evidence
of underweighting of probabilities: For 79% of the
subjects pɡ exceeded 1/2 and for 73% of the subjects
p exceeded 1/2.
Figure 1 displays the utility function for gains and
losses based on the median data. The data are con-
sistent with prospect theory’s hypothesis that utility
is convex for losses and concave for gains. Figure 1
also displays the utility function when the data are
analyzed under the assumption that expected util-
ity holds, i.e., assuming that there is no probability
weighting, w+p = w−p = p for all p. The ﬁgure
shows that under expected utility, utility is more con-
vex on the loss domain and more concave on the gain
domain than under prospect theory.
The conclusions drawn at the aggregate level were
conﬁrmed when we looked at the individual data.
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Figure 1 The Utility for Gains and Losses Under Prospect Theory and
Expected Utility Based on the Median Data
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Table 3 shows the classiﬁcation of subjects accord-
ing to the shape of their utility function. The most
common pattern is S-shaped utility: convex utility
on the loss domain and concave utility on the gain
domain. We found both more concavity for gains and
more convexity for losses and, hence, more support
for prospect theory than previous studies (Tversky
and Kahneman 1992, Fennema and van Assen 1998,
Abdellaoui 2000, Etchart-Vincent 2004, Schunk and
Betsch 2006, Booij and van de Kuilen 2006). Only one
subject behaved according to the traditional assump-
tion in economics of concave utility both for gains and
for losses.
Figure 2 displays the estimated power function for
the median data. The power coefﬁcients were 0.75 for
gains and 0.74 for losses. Both coefﬁcients differed
signiﬁcantly from 1. The power function ﬁtted the
median data well: the adjusted R2 exceeded 0.99 both
in the estimation for gains and in the estimation for
Table 3 Classiﬁcation of Subjects According to the
Shape of Their Utility Function
Losses
Gains Concave Convex Mixed Total
Concave 1 26 7 34
Convex 3 6 3 12
Mixed 0 1 1 2
Total 4 33 11 48
Figure 2 Parametric Fit of the Power Function Based on the Median
Data
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losses. The goodness of ﬁt is illustrated in Figure 2.
The median data points lie on or close to the ﬁtted
power function.
Table 4 shows the results from the parametric esti-
mations of the power function at the individual level.
The parametric estimations conﬁrm the conclusions
drawn above: Utility was concave on the gain domain
and convex on the loss domain. The ﬁt of the estima-
tions was very good with median individual adjusted
R2’s of 0.99 both for gains and for losses.
We also ﬁtted for each subject a power function to
the expected utilities. Table 4 shows that, by ignoring
probability weighting, expected utility led to utility
functions that were more concave on the gain domain
and more convex on the loss domain than under
prospect theory. In the parametric estimation, we
also found a more pronounced S-shaped utility func-
tion than previous studies (Tversky and Kahneman
1992, Fennema and van Assen 1998, Abdellaoui 2000,
Etchart-Vincent 2004, Schunk and Betsch 2006, Booij
and van de Kuilen 2006).
Table 4 Summary of Individual Parametric Fittings of Utility for
Gains Uxɡ= xɡ and Losses Ux =−x 
Gains Losses
PT EU PT EU
Mean 0.859 0.654 0.798 0.677
Median 0.717 0.576 0.725 0.567
St. dev. 0.394 0.341 0.401 0.370
IQR [0.61, 1.008] [0.46, 0.78] [0.60, 0.83] [0.46, 0.82]
Note. IQR stands for the interquartile range, PT for prospect theory,
EU for expected utility.
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We used the data from the parametric ﬁttings to
classify subjects according to the shape of their util-
ity function. Thirty-six out of 48 subjects had con-
cave utility on the gain domain and 40 subjects had
convex utility on the loss domain. Thirty-one subjects
had an S-shaped utility function: convex on the loss
domain and concave on the gain domain. Only ﬁve
subjects had a utility function that was everywhere
concave. The dominant pattern was clearly convex
utility on the loss domain and concave utility on the
gain domain.
5.2. Loss Aversion
Figure 3 displays the relationship between the
median of Gr and the median of −Lr , r = 0015
0031006300930125025, i.e., the relationship
between gains and losses that have the same util-
ity in absolute terms. The dashed line corresponds
to equality between median gains and median losses
that have the same utility in absolute terms. There
were six pairs GrLr that we could compare. We
found that −Lr < Gr in each comparison, which can
be seen from Figure 3 by observing that all pairs lie
below the dashed line. All differences between −Lr
and Gr were signiﬁcant by the paired t-test except for
the difference between −L0015 and G0015 p = 0186.
This latter difference was, however, signiﬁcant p =
0003 by a binomial test, which compared the pro-
portion of subjects for whom −L0015 >G0015 with the
proportion of subjects for whom −L0015 <G0015.
Figure 3 shows that the relationship between gains
and losses of the same absolute utility was close to
linear. The function Gr = 1928 ∗ −Lr1005 gave an
excellent ﬁt of the data (adjusted R2 = 1). The power
coefﬁcient was not signiﬁcantly different from 1,
Figure 3 The Relationship Between Median Gains and Median Losses
with the Same Absolute Utility
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which suggests a linear relationship between gains
and losses of the same absolute utility, with gains
being almost twice as large as losses.
Recall that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) deﬁned
loss aversion as −U−x > Ux for all x > 0. Our
ﬁnding that −Lr < Gr in each comparison implies, in
combination with −ULr = UGr, that −U−Gr >
UGr. Hence, using Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
deﬁnition, we found support for loss aversion at the
aggregate level.
Table 5 displays the results of the individual anal-
ysis of loss aversion. Columns 3 through 5 show the
classiﬁcation of the subjects both when we allow for
response error and, in parentheses, when response
error is not taken into account. Table 5 clearly shows
that it matters which deﬁnition of loss aversion is
adopted. According to the deﬁnitions of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Köbberling and Wakker
(2005), a large majority of our subjects was loss averse
regardless of whether response error was taken into
account. The deﬁnitions proposed by Neilson (2002)
and Bowman et al. (1999) are strict and by these only
a minority of subjects was loss averse. The deﬁni-
tion of Wakker and Tversky (1993) lies somewhere in
between. We found more loss aversion at the indi-
vidual level than Schmidt and Traub (2002) and than
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2002).
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 5 show the means
and the medians of the individual loss aversion coef-
ﬁcients. A table with all individual loss aversion
coefﬁcients can be found in the e-companion. For
the deﬁnitions of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Wakker and Tversky (1993) where we had eight obser-
vations per subject, we determined the individual
loss aversion coefﬁcient by taking the median of
these eight observations. The results based on the
mean of the eight observations were similar. The table
shows that the median loss aversion coefﬁcient under
the deﬁnition of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is
somewhat lower than the median values obtained by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and by Bleichrodt et al.
(2001), see Table 1. Our median estimate of the loss
aversion coefﬁcient under the deﬁnition of Wakker
and Tversky (1993) is in between the values obtained
by Schmidt and Traub (2002) and by Pennings and
Smidts (2003). It is much lower than the value in Fish-
burn and Kochenberger (1979).
Under the deﬁnition of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), both the mean (from 2.64 to 2.04) and
the median (from 1.97 to 1.69) value of the ratio
−U−Gr/UGr decreased with the size of the gains
and losses involved. A similar ﬁnding was reported
by Bleichrodt and Pinto (2002), who observed in
the health domain that the degree of loss aversion
decreased with the size of the outcomes. Under the
deﬁnition of Wakker and Tversky (1993), we did not
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Table 5 Results Under the Various Deﬁnitions of Loss Aversion
Method Coefﬁcient Loss averse Gain seeking Loss neutral Mean [St. dev.] Median [IQR]
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
−U−Gr 
UGr 
39 (31) 8 (3) 0 (0) 2.04 [1.40] 1.69 [1.19, 2.34]
Neilson (2002)
minULr /Lr 
maxUGr /Gr 
15 (12) 2 (1) 0 (0) 1.07 [1.17] 0.74 [0.39, 1.13]
Wakker and Tversky (1993)
U ′−Gr 
U ′Gr 
30 (16) 6 (1) 0 (0) 1.71 [0.97] 1.48 [1.06, 2.16]
Bowman et al. (1999)
minU ′Lr 
maxU ′Gr 
13 (6) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0.74 [0.69] 0.43 [0.32, 1.07]
Köbberling and Wakker (2005)
G0015
L0015
35 12 1 8.27 [15.24] 2.54 [0.98, 6.04]
Note. The numbers in parentheses refer to the case where no response error is allowed.
observe this effect; the degree of loss aversion varied,
but was not related to the size of the outcomes.
5.3. Reﬂection
Our aggregate ﬁndings suggest that the curvature
of utility on the gain domain is close to the cur-
vature of utility on the loss domain (see Table 4
and Figure 2). This is consistent with Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1979) reﬂection effect, which says that pref-
erences for prospects involving only losses are the
mirror image of preferences for prospects involving
only gains. Obviously, support for reﬂection is impor-
tant for practical decision analysis because it implies
that fewer data have to be collected as utility on the
loss domain can be inferred from utility on the gain
domain and vice versa. It is also interesting from a
theoretical point of view because support for reﬂec-
tion would indicate that a common psychophysical
response to an increasing amount of money gained or
lost underlies utility on the gain domain and on the
loss domain.
At the individual level we found less support for
reﬂection, however. Figure 4 displays the relation-
ship between the individual estimates for the power
coefﬁcient for gains and for the power coefﬁcient
for losses. The straight line corresponds to the pat-
tern predicted by reﬂection. Points inside the dotted
box are subjects who exhibit concave utility on the
gain domain and convex utility on the loss domain.
The ﬁgure shows that there is no clear relationship
between the power coefﬁcients. The Pearson corre-
lation coefﬁcient between the power coefﬁcients was
0.389, which differed signiﬁcantly from 1 p < 0001,
the case of perfect correlation predicted by reﬂection,
but also from 0 p = 0006, the case of no relation-
ship. Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rank correlation
coefﬁcient were equal to 0.117 and 0.164. They dif-
fered signiﬁcantly from 1 (p < 0001 in both tests), but
not from 0 (p > 010 in both tests).
We also assessed how bad it is to measure loss aver-
sion assuming reﬂection. We assumed power utility
both for gains and for losses and imposed for each
subject the power coefﬁcient for gains on the util-
ity for losses. Then we determined the implied losses
and used these to operationalize the various deﬁni-
tions of loss aversion. For example, to operational-
ize the deﬁnition of Köbberling and Wakker (2005)
we determined L0015 =−L1 ∗ 00151/ where  is the
power coefﬁcient for gains. Assuming reﬂection led
to the misclassiﬁcation of a considerable number of
subjects (i.e., subjects who were loss averse were now
classiﬁed as loss neutral or gain seeking or were
left unclassiﬁed): 16 out of 48 subjects (33.3%) were
misclassiﬁed according to Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) deﬁnition, 18 (37.5%) according to Köbberling
and Wakker’s (2005) deﬁnition, and 17 (35.4%) accord-
ing to Wakker and Tversky’s (1993) deﬁnition. For the
Neilson (2002) and Bowman et al. (1999) deﬁnitions,
these numbers were lower, nine and eight respec-
tively, but few subjects could be classiﬁed by these
deﬁnitions anyhow.
Figure 4 The Relationship Between Indivdual Power Coefﬁcients for
Gains and for Losses
Losses
Gains
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv: Loss Aversion Under Prospect Theory
1670 Management Science 53(10), pp. 1659–1674, © 2007 INFORMS
Table 6 Difference Between Observed Loss Aversion and Loss Aversion Predicted Under Reﬂection
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Wakker and Tversky (1993)
Mean Med Neilson (2002) Mean Med Bowman et al. (1999) Köbberling and Wakker (2005)
Median 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.17 −002 0.00 −013
IQR −072077 −057049 −002021 −032044 −055020 −007008 −293281
Table 6 shows the median values of the individ-
ual differences between the observed loss aversion
coefﬁcient and the loss aversion coefﬁcient predicted
under reﬂection and their interquartile ranges. At the
aggregate level assuming reﬂection does not lead to a
major distortion in the measured loss aversion coefﬁ-
cients as the median values are all close to zero. The
difference was only signiﬁcant for Neilson’s deﬁni-
tion (p = 0012 by Wilcoxon’s test). The interquartile
ranges reﬂect the fact that at the individual level con-
siderable distortions arise. This is in particular true
for Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) measure of loss
aversion. A table showing all individual differences
between the observed values of the loss aversion coef-
ﬁcients and those predicted under reﬂection is in the
e-companion.
6. Conclusion
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 311) noted that
“[t]he estimation of a complex choice model, such
as   prospect theory, is problematic. If the functions
associated with the theory are not constrained, the
number of estimated parameters for each subject is
too large.” We have shown that, contrary to the con-
jecture of Tversky and Kahneman, the estimation of
utility in prospect theory is not restrictively compli-
cated and can be performed without imposing para-
metric assumptions. In combination with the methods
described in Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt and
Pinto (2000) to measure probability weighting, our
method allows for a complete parameter-free elicita-
tion of prospect theory. The availability of nonpara-
metric methods to elicit prospect theory is important
for applications and tests of prospect theory.
Our method for measuring utility is based on
the elicitation of utility midpoints. As noted in §3,
Köbberling and Wakker (2003) pointed out before
how utility midpoints can be elicited. A disadvantage
of their procedure is that there is no control over the
endpoints: In Table 2 we are not free to select 2.
Like our method, Vind (2003) suggested a method to
elicit utility midpoints for given endpoints. Instead
of assuming prospect theory, Vind assumed a general
additive representation, which is not directly applica-
ble to prospect theory. Our method is more efﬁcient
than Vind’s method in that we need fewer measure-
ments to elicit a given number of utility midpoints.
The elicitation of p (or pɡ requires three measure-
ments. Once p (or pɡ is known, we need just one
measurement to determine a utility midpoint. Vind’s
(2003) method, on the other hand, requires three mea-
surements per utility midpoint.
Our method is sequential and involves chained
measurements. A potential danger with chained mea-
surements is propagation of response error. Both
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) and Abdellaoui et al.
(2005) examined in detail the effect of error prop-
agation on chained measurements and found that
the effect was negligible and did not affect their
conclusions. The elicitation methods that were used
in these two studies were similar to those used in our
study and, hence, we are inclined to conclude that
error propagation will not have distorted our ﬁnd-
ings. Blavatskyy (2006) showed theoretically that our
elicitation method is optimally efﬁcient in the sense
that it minimizes the effect of error on the inferred
utility function relative to other elicitation procedures.
Our experimental ﬁndings are in keeping with the
assumptions made by prospect theory. We found that
utility is convex for losses and concave for gains. We
observed more support for prospect theory than pre-
vious studies did. It is not entirely clear why this is the
case. We used outcomes of a larger size than Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), Fennema and van Assen (1998),
and Abdellaoui (2000), which suggests that the size of
the outcomes may be important. On the other hand,
Etchart-Vincent (2004), who used losses of similar size
as we did, found less convexity for losses. Another
reason why our results may be different is that we
used a different method, primarily based on the elic-
itation of certainty equivalents. Fennema and van
Assen (1998), Abdellaoui (2000), and Etchart-Vincent
(2004) all used the trade-off method. The trade-off
method involves four instead of three outcomes and,
in contrast with our method, imposes no bound on
the largest loss involved. Hence, the trade-off method
is likely to invoke more demanding cognitive pro-
cesses. On the other hand, the parametric estimates of
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which were different
from ours, were also based on certainty equivalences.
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) observed for gains no signiﬁ-
cant differences between trade-off measurements and
certainty equivalence measurements under prospect
theory. Whether their conclusions also hold for losses
is an open question.
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One contribution of using nonparametric elicitation
methods is that they may validate reasonable func-
tional forms and thus give license for certain types of
parametric estimation procedures. The advantage of
using parametric estimation methods over nonpara-
metric elicitation methods is that response errors will
be smoothened out and that relatively good estimates
can be obtained with a smaller set of prospects. We
found that a power function ﬁts our data very well,
suggesting that this function might be used in future
studies that aim to estimate prospect theory’s utility
function.
We found clear evidence of loss aversion both at
the aggregate and at the individual level. The degree
of loss aversion varied with the deﬁnition of loss
aversion used. The elicitation technique of this paper
does not commit to a particular deﬁnition of loss
aversion: it is “loss aversion deﬁnition-free” so to
speak. Two kinds of deﬁnition have been proposed
in the literature, global deﬁnitions and a local def-
inition. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Wakker and
Tversky (1993), Bowman et al. (1999), and Neilson
(2002) have proposed global deﬁnitions of loss aver-
sion. To operationalize their deﬁnitions they need
to scan the speciﬁc utility domain under study for
any loss aversion measurement. The local deﬁnition
of loss aversion, informally proposed by Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) and formalized by Köbberling and
Wakker (2005), measures loss aversion at the refer-
ence point and provides a natural “single-numbered”
measurement index for loss aversion. In this deﬁni-
tion loss aversion becomes manifest in the kink of the
utility function at the reference point.
The central question that must be answered in
choosing between local and global deﬁnitions of loss
aversion is whether loss aversion is a property that
can be deﬁned independently of utility curvature. In
the local deﬁnition of Köbberling and Wakker (2005)
loss aversion does not depend on utility curvature
and their deﬁnition allows a decomposition of risk
attitude into three distinct components: utility curva-
ture, probability weighting, and loss aversion. Global
deﬁnitions have the drawback that loss aversion can-
not be separated from utility curvature and, hence,
a clear separation of risk attitude into distinct com-
ponents is generally impossible. Our ﬁndings show
that the distinction between global measures and local
measures is not trivial, because for most subjects the
curvature of utility on the gain domain was clearly
different from the curvature of utility on the loss
domain. The latter observation also revealed a draw-
back of global measures of loss aversion: Because
loss aversion can be measured at different points
it can become difﬁcult to determine unambiguously
what the subject’s attitude toward losses is. Except for
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) deﬁnition, the global
measures indeed left many subjects unclassiﬁed. This
was particularly true for the measures proposed by
Neilson (2002) and Bowman et al. (1999). These deﬁ-
nitions may be useful for theorizing, but for empirical
purposes they seem too strict.
It is perhaps inevitable that when a new concept,
like loss aversion, is introduced, disagreement exists
about its precise meaning and deﬁnition. Now that
prospect theory seems to be emerging as the dom-
inant descriptive theory of decision under risk, and
our ﬁndings appear to underline this role, the need
for a common deﬁnition of loss aversion becomes
more urgent. Fully resolving the debate about how to
deﬁne loss aversion is beyond the scope of this paper.
We hope, however, that our ﬁndings will contribute
to this debate.
7. Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available
as part of the online version that can be found at
http://mansci.journal.informs.org/.
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Appendix A. Display of the Experimental
Questions
The questions in the ﬁrst step of the elicitation procedure
were displayed in the following manner (see Figure A1).
Figure A2, which was one of the questions in the second
step of our experimental procedure, illustrates the use of
the scrollbar.
Appendix B. The Bisection Method
The bisection method used to generate the iterations is illus-
trated in Table A1 for 1 and L00625. The prospect that
is chosen in each iteration is shown in bold. Table A1
shows that only the outcome that we sought to elicit varied.
Depending on the choice in an iteration, this outcome was
increased or decreased. The size of the change was always
half the size of the change in the previous question under
the restrictions that the resulting outcome should be a mul-
tiple of 10 and that the resulting probability should be a
multiple of 0.01. Otherwise the value was set equal to the
closest multiple of 10 or of 0.01. The method resulted in
an interval within which the indifference value should lie.
The midpoint of this interval was taken as the indifference
value. For example, in Table A1 the indifference value for
L00625 should lie between −4180 and −4560 and we took
−4370 as the indifference value.
Starting values in the iterations were generally chosen so
that prospects had equal expected value. Exceptions were
1, 2, 1, and 2, whose starting values were 0 + 3000,
1+ 3000, 0+ 3000, and 1+ 3000.
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Figure A1 Display of the Prospects
Figure A2 Illustration of the Scrollbar
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Table A1 An Illustration of the Bisection Method
Iteration Offered choices in elicitation of 1 Offered choices in elicitation of L00625
1 (−1000033−600) vs. −4000033−100 −6080 vs. (−78000780)
2 (−1000033−600) vs. −2500033−100 −3040 vs. −1000000780
3 −1000033−600 vs. (−1750033−100) −4560 vs. (−1000000780)
4 −1000033−600 vs. (−2100033−100) −3800 vs. −1000000780
5 (−1000033−600) vs. −2300033−100 −4180 vs. −1000000780
Indifference value −2200 −4370
Appendix C. Overview of the Main Parameters per Subject
Power function coefﬁcients Coefﬁcients loss aversion
Prospect Expected Kahneman and Wakker and
Probability theory utility Tversky (1979) Tversky (1993)
Bowman et al. Köbberling and
Subject pɡ p Gain Loss Gain Loss Mean Med Neilson (2002) Mean Med (1999) Wakker (2005)
S1 0.70 0.40 1.03 0.70 0.50 1.03 4.99 4.11 3.23 3.45 2.87 2.19 2048
S2 0.65 0.61 1.20 1.24 0.73 0.88 1.08 1.08 0.62 1.12 1.21 0.70 094
S3 0.56 0.56 1.02 0.60 0.84 0.49 2.49 2.25 0.92 1.63 1.63 0.41 645
S4 0.60 0.58 0.85 0.80 0.60 0.60 2.69 2.75 1.49 2.34 2.31 1.32 367
S5 0.50 0.68 0.57 0.85 0.57 0.46 0.89 0.85 0.49 1.22 1.08 0.42 070
S6 0.42 0.68 0.56 1.01 0.72 0.55 2.16 2.34 0.60 3.21 2.17 1.14 037
S7 0.60 0.69 0.96 0.79 0.69 0.43 1.86 1.85 1.43 1.86 1.84 1.05 206
S8 0.61 0.61 2.17 1.09 1.39 0.78 6.67 6.80 2.69 5.20 3.95 1.17 617
S9 0.76 0.42 1.28 0.66 0.44 0.85 2.10 2.08 0.92 1.45 1.06 0.41 438
S10 0.74 0.56 1.02 0.70 0.42 0.58 1.52 1.28 0.78 1.03 0.74 0.37 295
S11 0.44 0.60 0.72 0.68 0.90 0.48 1.65 1.72 0.36 1.63 1.56 0.44 111
S12 0.64 0.70 0.74 0.91 0.46 0.47 1.19 1.20 0.90 1.55 1.51 0.97 064
S13 0.58 0.58 0.72 0.67 0.56 0.52 1.54 1.39 0.57 1.37 1.22 0.43 248
S14 0.80 0.75 1.93 3.07 0.54 1.19 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.25 034
S15 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.82 0.49 0.67 1.45 1.53 0.67 2.11 1.84 0.81 059
S16 0.52 0.66 0.61 0.82 0.57 0.47 2.00 2.01 0.85 2.45 2.20 0.67 400
S17 0.71 0.77 1.00 0.85 0.47 0.31 3.19 3.06 2.55 2.84 2.52 2.16 380
S18 0.40 0.52 0.68 0.82 0.93 0.77 1.54 1.63 0.78 1.77 1.94 0.59 114
S19 0.63 0.66 0.96 0.80 0.61 0.49 1.45 1.54 1.04 1.29 1.30 0.81 109
S20 0.52 0.54 0.90 0.71 0.84 0.64 7.23 7.01 6.78 6.22 4.97 3.20 1187
S21 0.56 0.62 0.87 1.02 0.72 0.69 1.79 1.93 1.15 2.03 1.91 1.55 102
S22 0.54 0.58 0.69 0.66 0.61 0.52 1.13 1.13 0.40 1.17 1.13 0.36 100
S23 0.54 0.58 0.84 0.55 0.73 0.42 1.99 1.70 0.44 1.64 1.23 0.35 383
S24 0.65 0.62 0.50 0.54 0.30 0.36 1.66 1.57 0.18 1.32 1.06 0.13 600
S25 0.59 0.63 0.61 0.33 0.47 0.23 3.14 2.53 0.43 1.38 1.54 0.12 5600
S26 0.34 0.38 1.11 0.75 1.98 1.11 3.50 2.94 2.37 2.64 2.53 1.17 7100
S27 0.84 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.10 0.50 0.86 0.87 0.06 1.37 0.92 0.03 035
S28 0.22 0.39 0.51 0.51 1.25 0.69 4.75 4.35 2.54 4.13 2.67 1.19 2700
S29 0.62 0.63 0.87 0.75 0.58 0.51 1.89 2.06 1.12 1.97 2.02 0.88 120
S30 0.62 0.40 1.24 0.66 0.69 0.85 0.58 0.63 0.36 0.59 0.39 0.22 020
S31 0.58 0.56 2.05 0.71 1.45 0.59 2.30 1.92 1.01 1.21 0.90 0.23 1400
S32 0.44 0.64 0.49 1.01 0.58 0.64 0.52 0.41 0.30 1.10 0.88 0.36 028
S33 0.58 0.68 0.72 1.08 0.55 0.50 1.48 1.46 0.71 1.35 1.12 1.22 190
S34 0.64 0.60 0.46 0.80 0.30 0.56 1.04 1.06 0.22 1.18 1.07 0.26 070
S35 0.47 0.61 0.71 0.60 0.78 0.43 4.12 3.77 2.51 4.31 3.49 1.42 1777
S36 0.40 0.30 0.56 0.58 0.78 1.16 2.05 2.05 0.42 2.18 2.15 0.34 267
S37 0.67 0.71 0.86 0.81 0.48 0.38 4.68 4.32 3.15 4.61 4.12 2.68 540
S38 0.61 0.44 1.32 0.74 0.87 0.88 1.62 1.57 1.22 1.27 1.06 0.42 122
S39 0.72 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.29 0.36 1.73 1.76 0.37 1.54 1.49 0.31 277
S40 0.40 0.38 0.71 0.59 0.95 0.82 1.72 1.68 0.91 1.52 1.36 0.41 255
S41 0.68 0.22 0.50 0.51 0.29 1.09 0.86 0.87 0.27 1.04 1.19 0.09 121
S42 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.39 0.37 1.21 1.14 0.33 1.10 1.05 0.28 253
S43 0.60 0.58 0.67 0.81 0.48 0.62 1.66 1.66 0.77 1.64 1.46 0.59 279
S44 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.43 0.40 2.51 2.41 0.67 2.41 2.48 0.49 2333
S45 0.74 0.44 0.51 1.57 0.23 2.01 0.58 0.40 0.25 1.28 0.79 0.36 022
S46 0.77 0.14 0.63 0.50 0.25 2.04 3.22 2.37 0.77 4.23 2.10 0.33 5500
S47 0.52 0.50 0.66 0.87 0.61 0.87 0.80 0.80 0.23 0.93 0.93 0.30 068
S48 0.58 0.62 1.35 0.43 1.03 0.30 2.30 1.64 0.40 1.20 0.79 0.11 1900
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